Accessibility constraints When dealing with anaphora resolution, anaphoric expressions are often considered to have access to a restricted set of discourse referents. The choice of the relevant discourse referent inside this set may depends on various kinds of information (morphosyntactic features, semantic features, salience. . . ). But theories that give a dynamic interpretation of language also provide some ways to restrict the set of discourse referents by stating accessibility constraints.
A Montagovian flavour of DRT In [3] , the syntactic type of sentences s is interpreted with the semantic type: s = γ → (γ → t) → t. It means that (the semantic interpretation of) a sentence, instead of being a proposition, requires two arguments to produce a proposition. The first argument is its left context (we can think about it as the current set of discourse referents). The second argument is its right context, or its continuation: something able to return a proposition if fed with a (potentially updated) set of discourse referents.
Two sentences s 1 and s 2 are combined in the following way: s 1 .s 2 = λeφ. s 1 e (λe ′ . s 2 e ′ φ). It means that the result of the combination of s 1 and s 2 takes as input an environment e and a continuation φ. This environment is the same as the one s 1 has access to. So s 1 takes e as first parameter. Then, the continuation of s 1 is made of something taking e ′ as left environment 1 and the final result is the one we get by feeding s 2 with the new left environment e ′ and the same continuation as the s 1 .s 2 combination.
With this interpretation and the right semantic recipes (see [3] for the detailed lexical semantics) we get the following interpretation for John loves a woman: λeφ.∃y.woman y ∧ love j y ∧ φ (y :: e) where :: (of type e → γ → γ) is a function that adds a discourse referent to a set of discourse referents. Note that the continuation of this sentence, φ, will be provided with the y discourse referent, bound in the standard way by the existential quantifier.
Modelling other accessibility constraints To state as in DRT that negation blocks the access to discourse referents, [4] interprets: (doesn't VP)S = λeφ.¬((VP S) e (λe ′ .⊤)) ∧ φ e. The continuation of the sentence (φ) has no access to what VP and S could introduce as discourse referents, it only has access to the discourse referents of e 2 .
Note that an alternative could have been: (doesn't VP)S = λeφ.¬((VP S) e (λe ′ .φ e ′ )). But in this case, the continuation would also have been in the scope of the negation: the rest of the discourse would also be negated, which is not what we expect.
We propose to introduce the type of logical connectives κ = t → t → t and to interpret the syntactic type of sentences as s = κ → γ → (κ → γ → t) → t. Then negation can be interpreted as: (doesn't VP) S = λceφ.¬((VP S) (¬c) e(λc ′ e ′ .¬(φ c ′ e))). Without all the details, if we think as c being the logical connective ∧, we have the result to be interpreted as ¬((VP S) ∨ ¬(φ e)) ≡ (¬(VP S)) ∧ (φ e) which is now the expected result. Interestingly, we see that it could also give access to the discourse referents introduced by VP S to φ using the continuation λc ′ e ′ .¬(φ c ′ e ′ ). This, of course, is not expected, except for proper nouns (which are "always on top" in DRT). We then see how to add an additional left environment parameter for proper nouns (say e 1 ) so that negation blocks the discourse referents introduced by existentials (in e 2 ) but propagates the ones introduced by proper nouns. With the new value of s = κ → γ → γ → (κ → γ → γ → t) → t and of sentence composition: s 1 .s 2 = λce 1 e 2 φ. s 1 c e 1 e 2 (λc ′ e ′ 1 e ′ 2 . s 2 c ′ e ′ 1 e ′ 2 φ)) 3 , the negation is now interpreted as: doesn't = λV Sce 1 e 2 φ.¬((V S) (¬c) e 1 e 2 (λc ′ e ′ 1 e ′ 2 .¬(φ c ′ e ′ 1 e 2 ))). Together with the following interpretations:
we can interpret:
own ( a car ) = λS.S(λxce 1 e 2 φ.∃y.[λφ ′ .(c(car y)(φ ′ c e 1 e 2 )) ∧ (c(own x y)(φ ′ ce 1 e 2 ))] (λc ′ e ′ 1 e ′ 2 .φ c e ′ 1 (y :: e ′ 2 ))) ≡ λS.S(λxce 1 e 2 φ.∃y.[λφ ′ .c((car y) ∧ (own x y))(φ ′ c e 1 e 2 )] (λc ′ e ′ 1 e ′ 2 .φ c e ′ 1 (y :: e ′ 2 ))) = λS.S(λxce 1 e 2 φ.∃y.c((car y) ∧ (own x y))(φ c e 1 (y :: e 2 ))) thanks to the following equivalence (c is either ∧ or ∨):
Finally, a discourse d such as John doesn't own a car. It is red with the empty context nil and the empty continuation φ e = λce 1 e 2 .¬(c ⊤⊥) (which returns ⊤ under the ∧ connective and ⊥ under the ∨ connective) is interpreted as:
(car y ∧ own j y) ∨ (¬(red(sel(j :: nil))))) ≡ (¬∃y.(car y ∧ own j y)) ∧ red(sel(j :: nil))
It shows that whereas the discourse referent introduced by y is not accessible to the sel operator, the discourse referent introduced by j would be accessible, in spite of the negation. We extend this approach to model the RFC, introducing a parameter for the type of discourse relations: subordinating or coordinating, and two ways of combining sentences: s 1 . c s 2 and s 1 . s s 2 instead of just one s 1 .s 2 . The interpretation of these two combinations manage the set of discourse referents so that the environment given to s 2 only includes the set of discourse referents defined by the RFC. As for now, we only deal with discourse structures that can be described by a formula (or syntactic tree) made of the . c and of the . s connectives. Discourse pops or discourse structure that are not trees, for instance, are not yet considered.
We consider a new type κ = γ → γ → γ and s = κ → γ → γ → (κ → γ → γ → t) → t, and we define Coord = λe 1 e 2 .e 2 and Sub = λe 1 e 2 .e 1 ∪ e 2 . We give the following definition of sentence composition: )) φ)) which means that in addition to the environment introduced by their previous discourse unit (e ′ 1 for s 2 and e ′′ 1 for s 3 ), s 2 and s 3 have access to (c e 1 e 2 ) whose value is: either e 2 if the whole part of the discourse is in a coordinating relation with what comes before (and then only s 1 should access e 1 ), or e 1 ∪ e 2 if the whole part is in a subordinating relation with what comes before (and the previous unit dominates s 1 , s 2 and s 3 and each have access to e 1 and e 2 ).
Conclusion
We show how [3]'s approach is flexible enough to model various accessibility constraints, such as the ones for discourse referents introduced by proper nouns or by the hierarchical structure of the discourse. Moreover, it proves to be able to combine the different constraints. We hope this could be helpful to give an account of the hierarchy of referential expressions and their adequacy to the RFC [1] by combining various constraints for pronouns or definite descriptions for instance. 
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